A compact, coherent introduction to the study of rational belief, this text provides points of entry to such areas of philosophy as theory of knowledge, methodology of science, and philosophy of language. The book is accessible to all undergraduates and presupposes no philosophical training.

It is human nature to try to recognize patterns and to make sense of that which we observe. Unfortunately, our intuition is often wrong, and so there is a need to impose some objectivity on the methods by which observations are converted into knowledge. One definition of biostatistics could be precisely this, the rigorous and objective conversion of medical and/or biological observations into knowledge. Both consumers of biostatistical principles and biostatisticians themselves vary in the extent to which they recognize the (...) need to continue the improvement. Some may not recognize the need for (some or all of) the methods that have already been developed; others may accept these as they find them completely sufficient; still others recognize both the value and the shortcomings of these methods, and seek to develop even better methods to ensure that future medical conclusions are less subject to biases than current ones are. (shrink)

A number of nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms have been introduced to model the set of beliefs of an agent. These include the extensions of a default logic, the stable models of a general logic program, and the extensions of a truth maintenance system among others. In [13] and [16], the authors introduced nonmonotomic rule systems as a nonlogical generalization of all essential features of such formulisms so that theorems applying to all could be proven once and for all. In this paper, (...) we extend Rieter's normal default theories, which have a number of the nice properties which make them a desirable context for belief revision, to the setting of nonmonotonic rule systems. Reiter defined a default theory to be normal if all the rules of the default theory satisfied a simple syntatic condition. However, this simple syntatic condition has no obvious analogue in the setting of nonmonotonic rule systems. Nevertheless, an analysis of the proofs of the main results on normal default theories reveals that the proofs do not rely on the particular syntactic form of the rules but rather on the fact that all rules have a certain consistency property. This led us to extend the notion of normal default theories with respect to a general consistency property. This extended notion of normal default theories, which we call Forward Chaining normal , is easily lifted to nonmonotomic rule systems and hence applies to general logic programs and truth maintenance. (shrink)

This book is a collection of Rush Rhees' recent articles on Wittgenstein along with a record of Wittgenstein's comments on continuity made in private conversations in 1938. The first part of the book is on the Tractatus. It begins with a review of Anscombe's Introduction of which Rhees generally approves and then goes on to discuss the "picture theory" and language's capacity to get hold of reality. Rhees argues against Maslow that elementary statements are more than psychological phenomena but must (...) be spoken of in a purely formal sense. Commenting on Black's Companion he argues that Wittgenstein did not have in mind any ontological implications of logic when he was working on the Tractatus. Rhees uses his critique of Pitcher's Philosophy of Wittgenstein and an article on that philosophy to form the transition to the discussion of the later Wittgenstein. He insists that Wittgenstein taught more a method of seeing the depth of certain problems than a set of solutions to those problems. He introduces the theme of "publicness" by arguing that language involves the ability to "say something" and must thus involve publicity. In his article on "Wittgenstein's Builders" he argues that this ability to say something rests on the interrelation of language games and the unity of a form of life. Using this as a basis, he speaks of the Wittgensteinean approach to ethics as one of studying the way of saying something ethically in a certain language game rather than one of studying ethics in general. The essay on continuity begins with a discussion of the dependence of mathematical language on everyday language for meaning. Here Wittgenstein argues that mathematical language derives its sense from experiential language and not from eternal and immutable objects. He discusses the mathematical notion of continuity with an eye to the limits of its sense and shows that its sense is limited by ordinary notions of space and continuity and tests relating to them. This book is worth reading for both the presentation of basic approaches to understanding Wittgenstein and for the record of Wittgenstein's remarks on continuity which are unavailable elsewhere.--J. V. W. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to contribute to research in the philosophy of social science. The study focuses upon select epistemological and ontological aspects of Hannah Arendt’s work from which methodological implications are drawn pertaining to sociology. Arendt, although critical of the sociology of her time, has become increasingly cited and influential for emerging sociological research and this study seeks to contribute to this by focusing upon the problem of novelty. The aim is to explore the philosophical and methodological implications of novelty (...) for social science by working through three case studies that are theoretically pivotal for social science—action, the ‘social’, and the self—in terms of novelty as expressed in Arendt’s writing. Arendt is critical of methodology and epistemology, aiming to draw her readers to ontological concerns outlined from her preoccupation with the 'world' and social reality. In this aim, Arendt seeks to distance herself from social sciences that she claims ignore human novelty in favour of reading social regularities, tendencies and similarities. Despite her disdain for method, Arendt suggests a anti-methodological 'method' (outlined in an overlooked footnote) for keeping trained upon and for dealing with novel, anomalous events. In the seed of this method lies a unique opportunity for social science to reassess and extend its methods, addressing this oversight and in so doing bring to light the novel social object as a legitimate subject of social research. (shrink)

Abstract‘Yellow Rain’, an alleged biological warfare agent thought to be utilized in parts of both South East Asia and Afghanistan, may be composed in part of the mycotoxins, trichothecenes. However, more recent analyses suggest that the ‘Rain’ was mainly honey bee excreta. The history of the controversy together with the biological effects, chemistry as well as the fungi producing these mycotoxins and agricultural commodities affected by trichothecenes are reviewed.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

We show that if there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal and the Steel core model K exists, then every Jónsson cardinal is Ramsey in K, and every δ-Jónsson cardinal is δ-Erdös in K. In the absence of the Steel core model K we prove the same conclusion for any model L[E] such that either V = L[E] is the minimal model for a Woodin cardinal, or there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal and V is (...) a generic extension of L[E]. The proof includes one lemma of independent interest: If V = L[A], where A $\subset$ κ and κ is regular, then L κ [A] is a Jónsson algebra. The proof of this result, Lemma 2.5, is very short and entirely elementary. (shrink)

We show that if there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal and the Steel core model K exists, then every Jonsson cardinal is Ramsey in K, and every $\delta$-Jonsson cardinal is $\delta$-Erdos in K. In the absence of the Steel core model K we prove the same conclusion for any model L$[\mathscr{E}]$ such that either V = L$[\mathscr{E}]$ is the minimal model for a Woodin cardinal, or there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal and V is (...) a generic extension of L$[\mathscr{E}]$. The proof includes one lemma of independent interest: If V = L$[\mathscr{A}]$, where A $\subset$ $\kappa$ and $\kappa$ is regular, then L$_\kappa$[A] is a Jonsson algebra. The proof of this result, Lemma 2.5, is very short and entirely elementary. (shrink)

An information-theoretic approach is shown to derive both the classical weak-field equations and the quantum phenomenon of metric fluctuation within the Planck length. A key result is that the weak-field metric $\bar h_{\mu \nu } $ is proportional to a probability amplitude φuv, on quantum fluctuations in four-position. Also derived is the correct form for the Planck quantum length, and the prediction that the cosmological constant is zero. The overall approach utilizes the concept of the Fisher information I acquired in (...) a measurement of the weak-field metric. An associated physical information K is defined as K=I−J, where J is the information that is intrinsic to the physics (stress-energy tensor Tμv) of the measurement scenario. A posited conservation of information change δI=ΔJ implies a variational principle δK=0. The solution is the weak-field equations in the metric $\bar h_{\mu \nu } $ and associated equations in the probability amplitudes φuv. The gauge condition φ v uv =0 (Lorentz condition) and conservation of energy and momentum Tv μv=0 are used. A well-known “bootstrapping” argument allows the weak-field assumption to be lifted, resulting in the usual Einstein field equations. A special solution of these is well known to be the geodesic equations of motion of a particle. Thus, the information approach derives the classical field equations and equations of motion, as well as the quantum nature of the probability amplitudes φuv. (shrink)

This volume is intended for use in an undergraduate philosophy course employing the problems' approach. Chapter I provides a clear presentation of Cartesian rationalism. Following the exposition of Descartes' position, there is a section on the standard criticisms levelled by B. Russell. Aune defends the rationalist position with an outline of the traditional arguments for the validity of intuitive knowledge. Chapter I terminates with a list of "Study Questions" and an annotated bibliography suggesting further readings. Chapter II considers classical English (...) empiricism, taking the thought of Hume as paradigmatic. There is a discussion of a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as a section on the problems of induction and solipsism. Chapter III outlines the attempts of contemporary empiricists to eschew Hume's skepticism by envisioning the world as a construct of our sensory experiences. To avoid the solipsism still implicit in the latter position, a re-evaluation of Hume's theory of perception is offered. Wittgenstein and Strawson are briefly treated in this section. Chapter IV explains the pragmatist's attempt to reduce to the same untenable position the rationalist and empiricist views of the a priori. Chapter V concentrates on the pragmatic theory of justification and includes a treatment of N. Goodman's "new riddle of induction." Aune's book is a readable account of conflicting theories of knowledge and undergraduates should find it of value.--W. J. L. (shrink)

This volume is intended for use in an undergraduate philosophy course employing the problems' approach. Chapter I provides a clear presentation of Cartesian rationalism. Following the exposition of Descartes' position, there is a section on the standard criticisms levelled by B. Russell. Aune defends the rationalist position with an outline of the traditional arguments for the validity of intuitive knowledge. Chapter I terminates with a list of "Study Questions" and an annotated bibliography suggesting further readings. Chapter II considers classical English (...) empiricism, taking the thought of Hume as paradigmatic. There is a discussion of a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as a section on the problems of induction and solipsism. Chapter III outlines the attempts of contemporary empiricists to eschew Hume's skepticism by envisioning the world as a construct of our sensory experiences. To avoid the solipsism still implicit in the latter position, a re-evaluation of Hume's theory of perception is offered. Wittgenstein and Strawson are briefly treated in this section. Chapter IV explains the pragmatist's attempt to reduce to the same untenable position the rationalist and empiricist views of the a priori. Chapter V concentrates on the pragmatic theory of justification and includes a treatment of N. Goodman's "new riddle of induction." Aune's book is a readable account of conflicting theories of knowledge and undergraduates should find it of value.--W. J. L. (shrink)